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Introduction
In early 2013, based on the recommendations of the
EU–US,High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth,
the presidents of the European Council, the European
Commission (the Commission) and the US announced
the initiation of negotiations on a major free trade
agreement between the two blocs, termed the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).1
The TTIP initiative promises significant economic
development for the Transatlantic Free Trade Area
(TFTA) and provision for investor–state dispute
settlement (ISDS),2 which is mainly associated with
international arbitration under the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).3
Respondents to a public consultation on TTIP,
representing a wide spectrum of EU civil society
organisations, expressed concern over ISDS’s impact on
EU Member States’ right to regulate in the public’s
interest, if investors are armed with the right to launch
international proceedings to challenge national policy.4
Similar concerns were expressed over the secretive nature
of the negotiations, with many critics pointing to
democratic values and human rights as the bedrock of a
civilised society.5 These concerns cast a shadow of
uncertainty over the intended and unintended
consequences of TTIP and, in particular, its encroachment
on democratic values. In response to the rejection of
ISDS, the Commission released proposals for an
international investment court in August 2015.6We argue
that these reforms are merely cosmetic and are unlikely
to alleviate some of the concerns raised over ISDS and,
in particular, its intrusion on national public policy.
The aim of this article is threefold. First and foremost,
it examines the nature of the TTIP proposals with
particular emphasis on the international investment court.
The aim is to highlight how the secretive negotiations
have undermined the most basic notions of democracy
such as transparency and sovereignty. Secondly, it
highlights areas where the fundamental principles of
human rights have been undermined by the TTIP
negotiations. Thirdly, the proposal for an international
investment court is critiqued, especially on the inclusion
of broad fair and equitable treatment (FET) standards that
are likely to promote the same unfettered rights as those
found under ISDS. Ultimately, a circumspect conclusion
that ties together the various strands of argument through
the paper is reached.
TTIP negotiations through the lens of
human rights
The controversies emanating out of the secretive nature
of negotiations between the EU and the US have led the
Commission to seek more transparency in the TTIP
negotiations by employing a so-called “transparency
initiative” in 2015.7 However, a closer look into the
transparency initiative shows that very little information
is provided to the public regarding the ongoing
negotiations between the EU and the US, in the form of
brief factsheets.8 The factsheets and negotiating texts
merely indicate a summary of the proposals given out by
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1High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, Final Report (11 February 2013), available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf;
European Commission (the Commission), Conceptual Paper, “Investment in TTIP and beyond—the path for reform. Enhancing the right to regulate and moving from
current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court” (5May 2015); EU, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce”,
draft document tabled for discussion with the US (12 November 2015), Ch.II: Investment, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955
.pdf [Both accessed 27 June 2016].
2The TTIP mandate provides for investment negotiations including ISDS Council Document No.11103/13 EU (9 October 2014), available at: http://data.consilium.europa
.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pd [Accessed 27 June 2016]; also see Commission Concept Paper, Investment in TTIP and beyond—the path for reform (5
May 2015).
3 See G. van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Ch.7; Gus van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign
Constraints (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Chs 1 and 4.
4O. Wright and N. Morris, “British sovereignty ‘at risk’ from EU–US trade deal: UK in danger of surrendering judicial independence to multinational corporations, warn
activists”, Independent, 14 January 2014; for commentary on the private/public rights debate see Louis T. Wells, “Backlash to Investment Arbitration: Three Causes” in C.
Balchin, L.K. Chung, A. Kaushal andM.Waibel (eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International, 2010), pp.341–352;
N. Blackaby, “Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration” in Albert van den Berg (ed.), International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions
(Kluwer Law International, 2003), p.355.
5Wright and Morris, “British sovereignty ‘at risk’ from EU–US trade deal”, Independent, 14 January 2014; Friends of the Earth Europe, “The hidden cost of EU trade deals:
Investor-State Dispute Settlement cases taken against EU member states” (December 2014), available at: http://foeeurope.org/hidden-cost-eu-trade-deals [Accessed 27
June 2016].
6TTIP (12 November 2015), Ch.II: Investment
7Commission, “Commission publishes TTIP legal texts as part of transparency initiative” (7 January 2015), available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id
=1231 [Accessed 27 June 2016].
8Commission, “EU negotiating texts in TTIP” (10 February 2015), available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 [Accessed 27 June 2016].
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the Commission, without discussing how these have been
received or how the negotiations progress between the
parties.
Attempts to block the Commission from going forward
with the TTIPwere made by various civil society groups,
but these were unsuccessful.9 The “Stop TTIP” initiative10
is still actively campaigning and has received more than
three million signatures and called the Commission on a
number of occasions to stop the free trade agreement
between the EU and the US. The initiative has criticised
the Commission for failing to register it as an ECI
(European Citizens’ Initiative), arguing that it violated
art.11(4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and
arts 2(1) and 4(2)(b) of the European Citizens’ Initiative
(ECI) Regulation.11Under the ECI Regulation, individuals
from EU Member States can invite the Commission to
submit a proposal for a legal act which they consider to
be required in order to implement the EU Treaties.
However, the Commission rejected the registration of the
proposed citizens’ initiative entitled “Stop TTIP”.
In its response to the proposal, the Commission
submitted that:
“Hence, as a matter of principle, the signature and
conclusion of an international agreement with a
given subject and content may be requested by a
citizens’ initiative. Conversely, the preparatory
Council decisions authorising the opening of
international negotiations or repealing such
authorisation do not fall within the scope of the
Regulation.”12
It further pointed out that:
“[P]ursuant to Article 2, point 1 of the Regulation a
citizens’ initiative may only invite the Commission,
within the framework of its powers, to submit an
appropriate proposal for a legal act considered
necessary by the citizens for the purpose of
implementing the Treaties. Conversely, a citizens’
initiative inviting the Commission not to propose a
legal act is not admissible under that provision.”13
It is argued that the response of the Commission and its
refusal to register “Stop TTIP” as an ECI is ignoring the
foundational principle of the initiative which is to allow
EU citizens to participate directly in the development of
EU policies.14
In one of its recent reports, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated:
“Trade agreements invariably affect the human rights of
consumers, residents, workers, those in poverty and
others, and on the ability of States to regulate and protect
the human rights of their people.”15 The OHCHR
highlighted that “it is essential that any proposed trade
agreement is assessed in terms of its impact on human
rights, including the right to health”.16
Sensitive issues that the TTIP may struggle to address,
such as data protection, have already been the object of
heated debates in agreements between the EU and the
US. A landmark case recently decided by the European
Court of Justice declared the Safe Harbour Agreement
invalid and ruled that data transfer to the US is subject to
the data protection requirements of EUMember States.17
Concerns over whether the Commission’s Decision
2000/520 on the Safe Harbour Agreement should be
reversed had been voiced, particularly owing to the
discrepancies between European and US practice, most
notably the permission that US law grants public
authorities to gather data under the Safe Harbour
Agreement.18
One of the further concerns raised by human rights
groups is that the TTIP will impede access to the right to
affordable drinking water and sanitation. This right is
safeguarded by a number of UN human rights instruments
and is considered essential to the full realisation of all
other human rights.19 In responding to concerns that the
“TTIP threatens the special role of public services in
sectors such as health, education, social services or
water”, the Commission has briefly responded through a
factsheet, stating that:
“The EU does not take any commitments for
publicly funded health, education or social services.
The same applies to the collection, purification and
distribution of water. Member States can take any
measures they wish now and in the future in these
areas.”20
The Commission has also added that:
“TTIP won’t affect governments’ ability to: operate
public monopolies or grant exclusive rights to a
particular private supplier; decide how to run water
distribution services, or publicly-funded education,
health or social services; or subsidise these services
… For healthcare social services and education
9Stop TTIP, “Stop TTIP hands 3,284,289 signatures toMartin Schulz” (9 November 2015), available at: https://stop-ttip.org/stop-ttip-hands-3-3-signatures-to-martin-schulz
/ [Accessed 27 June 2016].
10 Stop TTIP, “Stop TTIP hands 3,284,289 signatures to Martin Schulz” (9 November 2015).
11European Parliament, “European Citizens’ Initiative”, information compiled by Petr Novak (October 2015), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice
/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.5.html [Accessed 27 June 2016].
12Commission, “Your request for registration of a proposed citizens’ initiative entitled ‘STOP TTIP’” (10 September 2014), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative
/public/documents/2552 [Accessed 27 June 2016].
13Commission, “Your request for registration of a proposed citizens’ initiative entitled ‘STOP TTIP’” (10 September 2014).
14European Citizens’ Initiative, Official Register, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome [Accessed 27 June 2016].
15Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Pacific Trade and the Right to Health”, p.1, available at: http://pacific.ohchr.org/docs/PacificTradeRightToHealth
.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2016].
16Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Pacific Trade and the Right to Health”, p.8.
17 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (C-362/14) EU:C:2015:650; [2016] Q.B. 527; [2016] 2 C.M.L.R. 2.
18B. Treacy and A. Bapat, “Scrapping Safe Harbor: European Scare Mongering or a Real Possibility?” (2014) 15 Privacy & Data Protection 4.
19UN General Assembly, Resolution 64/292, A/64/L.63/Rev.1; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.15.
20Commission, “Services in TTIP (factsheet)”, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_152999.2%20Services.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2016].
TTIP Negotiations in the Shadow of Human Rights and Democratic Values 317
[2016] I.C.C.L.R., Issue 9 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
which receive public funding or support in any form
or for services providing water for drinking, or for
industrial use, governments don’t have to give access
to their markets to service providers from outside
the EU. TTIP will not change this. Instead,
governments can prevent foreign firms from
providing, or investing in, these services.”21
Despite these assurances, and in light of the secretive
nature of negotiations, it is still unclear how a final
agreement will affect water distribution services or
whether US companies will be given access to water
services as private suppliers. In more general terms, the
privatisation of public services is often criticised for being
capable of impacting on key economic and social rights,
including the right to health, education, water and
sanitation.22 To an extent, this may also affect social
welfare in general through the implementation of financial
measures on the import of products that are more strictly
regulated in the EU than in the US, particularly
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In response to
these allegations, the Commission has stated: “The EU
has a strict system for deciding whether to allow
companies to sell any given GMO in the EU. This is
entirely separate from trade negotiations.”23
Against promises by the Commission that the TTIP
would be a tool for economic growth and key to the
potential creation of more jobs on both sides of the
Atlantic, opponents to the trade agreement have raised
concerns that it might lead to the loss of jobs. An
economic assessment report prepared by the Centre for
Economic Policy Research in London indicated a 0.5%
rise by 2027 as a direct benefit of entering into the TTIP.24
However, John Hilary, director of the charity War on
Want, dismissed the findings of the report as inconclusive
and warned that the treaty will actually lead to a massive
loss of jobs, based on a more recent study that showed
an “expected loss of around 600,000 jobs in the EU as a
result of TTIP, as well as a significant reduction in labour
income for workers in France, Germany, the UK and
other Northern European countries”.25 In a report
published in October 2015, the Commission pledged to
respect the rights of workers. It stated that “[the
Commission] wants to include provisions on labour and
environmental issues of relevance in a trade context, for
increased trade and investment to improve workers’ rights
and environmental protection”.26
Turning to the current standard-setting framework for
trade agreements, a potential question is whether TTIP
will have an impact on the implementation of and respect
for the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact
Assessment and Trade Agreements 2011 and the
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights 2012. For the TTIP to be an effective tool for
growth, it is imperative to set out clear human rights
obligations for investors and ensure adherence to
international norms on corporate social responsibility. It
is still unclear whether the TTIP will result in a
“back-door” system where traders who fail to adhere to
strict regulations can use the TTIP to obtain certification
in the US—avoiding European or national regulations
that would otherwise block them from trading on
European soil.27
TTIP negotiations and democratic values
The ongoing TTIP negotiations continue to raise a number
of serious concerns which critics have, at the extreme,
suggested assault fundamental notions of sovereignty and
the rule of law which underpin all liberal democracies.28
Aside from the motivations and content of the trade
agreement, the highly secretive manner in which the
negotiations are being conducted has attracted equal if
not even greater criticism.
These controversies are well illustrated by the lack of
information freely available to European politicians—let
alone more widely to the general public—as to the
substance of the negotiations. In the face of mounting
criticism over the lack of transparency, the Commission
has attempted to respond to some of the concerns by
widening access to the TTIP texts and publishing the
EU’s negotiating proposals.29 Starkly indicating how
secretive the negotiations have been, until December
2015, approximately only 30 members of the European
Parliament had been granted access to TTIP documents.30
Currently, although all MEPs are granted privileged
access to read TTIP documents and take hand-written
notes, they can only do so in a secure reading room in
21Commission, “Protecting public services in TTIP and other EU trade agreements” (13 July 2015), available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1115
[Accessed 27 June 2016].
22World Health Organisation, “Pacific Trade and Human Rights” (2014), available at: http://www.wpro.who.int/southpacific/publications/trade_and_human_rights.pdf
[Accessed 27 June 2016].
23Commission, “Trade—About TTIP: basics, benefits, concerns”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/questions-and-answers/index_en
.htm [Accessed 27 June 2016].
24Centre for Economic Policy Research (London), Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic Assessment (March 2013), prepared under
implementing Framework Contract TRADE10/A2/A16, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2016].
25 J. Hilary, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 2015 update” (February 2015), available at: http://media.waronwant.org/sites/default/files/TTIP%20booklet
%20for%20RLS,%202015%20update.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2016].
26Commission, “Report of the Eleventh Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” (Miami, 19–23 October 2015), available at: http:/
/trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153935.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2016].
27V. de Beaufort, “The European Union and the New Face(s) of International Trade” (2015) 1 International Business Law Journal 39.
28M.S. Cato, “I’ve seen the secrets of TTIP, and it is built for corporations not citizens”, The Guardian, 4 February 2015; O. Wright and N. Morris, “British sovereignty
‘at risk’ from EU–US trade deal: UK in danger of surrendering judicial independence to multinational corporations, warn activists”, Independent, 14 January 2014; G.
Monbiot, “This transatlantic trade deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy”, The Guardian, 4 November 2013.
29Commission, “Commission to further boost TTIP transparency”, News Archive (19 November 2014), available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id
=1201 [Accessed 27 June 2016].
30European Parliament, “All MEPs to have access to all confidential TTIP documents”, Press Release (2 December 2015), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu
/news/en/news-room/20151202IPR05759/All-MEPs-to-have-access-to-all-confidential-TTIP-documents [Accessed 27 June 2016].
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the European Parliament in Brussels under exceptionally
strict conditions. In order to prevent leaks, no personal
possessions are allowed into the room, individuals must
sign a strict confidentiality agreement, and they must be
accompanied at all times.31 In February 2016, privileged
access to TTIP documents was extended to British MPs,
albeit under similar rules of confidentiality in the
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in
Westminster.32 Nevertheless, critics have pointed to the
secretive manner of the negotiations as a strong indication
that corporate interests will trump the interests of ordinary
civilians, while the most sceptical go even further.
Furthermore, owing to the inherent secrecy of the
negotiations, little is known about the actual content of
the negotiations, save for the occasional leak and the
publication of brief factsheets, negotiating texts and
position papers.33
Although the leading advocates of the negotiations
reject the most extravagant criticisms as hyperbolic
speculation, there remains much to be said about the lack
of transparency and public participation in the negotiation
process. The content of the negotiations and the manner
in which the trade agreement is being drafted raise a much
more fundamental question concerning the powers of the
EU, and the Commission in particular, and the inherent
conflict with Member States’ sovereignty. If, as critics
allege, the TTIP will reduce regulations and safeguards
which ensure consumer product quality and environmental
standards, serious doubts must be raised as to whether
the sovereignty of Member States is being respected.
In that regard, one of the most persistent objections to
the current proposals concerns the system of dispute
resolution, which would essentially allow corporations
to sue Member States or the EU itself in secretive
arbitration panels for loss of profits or other action which
could harm business interests. In November 2015,
following an extremely critical public consultation into
the ISDS model which is commonly used in similar but
smaller-scale trade agreements,34 the Commission revealed
that it would instead pursue proposals for an investment
court to be included in the TTIP.35 However, responses
to the proposed investment court have not been
favourable, with critics among civil society suggesting
that the Commission has only rebranded the ISDS system
with minor improvements which do not address the most
troubling concerns.36
In particular, opponents suggest that the Tribunal of
First Instance will comprise a judicial bench of three
corporate lawyers, who would not by any standard satisfy
the need for an independent and impartial tribunal for a
number of reasons. For example, in a serious blow to the
Commission’s proposals, on 4 February 2016, the German
Association of Judges published a letter arguing that the
process of appointing judges and the positions of the
judges themselves would not meet international standards
of independence in professional and financial terms.37
Regarding the concerns over the professional
independence of the investment court, the judges claimed
that the process of selection and appointment of judges
would not be based on objective criteria in order to ensure
independence. First, as the judges would only be selected
from a narrow pool of experts practising in international
commercial dispute resolution—ensuring that the
investment court had adequate expertise in the particular
legal systems of individual Member States would be
difficult to achieve.38 Furthermore, relying upon lawyers
who are predominantly engaged in international
arbitration raises concerns that the appointed judges could
simultaneously be representing corporations in other
proceedings. If appointed judges were in a position of
representing corporations in other proceedings, it is
difficult to see how this arrangement would satisfy one
of the important elements of open justice, that not only
must justice be done, it must also be seen to be done.39
Finally, regarding the financial independence of the
investment court, the judges doubted whether the
relatively low “retainer fee” for the appointed judges
would be sufficient to ensure the independence of the
proposed tribunal.40
Although there were initial concerns that the proposed
investment court would replicate the worst shortcomings
of the ISDS system by holding proceedings in secret and
precluding the right of appeal or the possibility of
third-party interventions, the new investment court
proposals do seem to have addressed and appeased these
troubling issues. The new Commission proposals ensure
that proceedings will be heard mostly in open sessions,
and that there will be an appeal tribunal and the possibility
for third parties to intervene but only to the extent that
an intervention supports one of the disputing parties.41
Nevertheless, as it stands, such an adjudicative system
31Cato, “I’ve seen the secrets of TTIP, and it is built for corporations not citizens”, The Guardian, 4 February 2015.
32 P. Inman, “MPs can view TTIP files—but take only pencil and paper with them”, The Guardian, 18 February 2016.
33Commission, “EU negotiating texts in TTIP”, News Archive (10 February 2015).
34Commission, “The Commission to consult European public on provisions in EU–US trade deal on investment and investor-state dispute settlement”, Press Release (21
January 2014), available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-56_en.htm [Accessed 27 June 2016].
35EU, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (12 November 2015), Ch.II: Investment.
36 Pia Eberhardt, War on Want, “The Zombie ISDS: Rebranded as ICS, rights for corporations to sue states refuse to die”, (Corporate Europe Observatory, February 2016),
available at: http://media.waronwant.org/sites/default/files/The%20zombie%20ISDS.pdf?_ga=1.216396702.901736199.1455710514 [Accessed 27 June 2016].
37 In addition to the concerns over the IC’s structure, the German Association of Judges rejected the legal basis for the IC. See Deutscher Richterbund, “Opinion on the
establishment of an investment tribunal in TTIP”, DRB Opinion No.04/16 (February 2016), available at: https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu-us_trade_deal
/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2016].
38Deutscher Richterbund, “Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal in TTIP” (February 2016), available at: https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu
-us_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2016].
39 See R. v Sussex Justices Ex p. McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256 KBD at 259; Hobbs v CT Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 K.B. 1 CA; R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) [2000] 1 A.C. 119; [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272; 6 B.H.R.C. 1 HL.
40Under current proposals, judges in the Tribunal of First Instance will be paid a retainer fee of €2,000 per month plus an allowance for actual service (TTIP Draft Ch.II
s.3 art.9(12)), and judges in the Appeal Tribunal will be paid a retainer fee of €7,000 per month plus an allowance for actual service (TTIP Draft Ch.II s.3 art.10(12)).
41TTIP Draft Ch.II s.3 arts 10 and 23 respectively.
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would undoubtedly undermine and conflict with the most
basic requirement that courts be independent and
impartial.
The decision to continue conducting the negotiations
in the highest secrecy is perplexing at a time when public
trust in the EU, and the Commission in particular, remains
worryingly low.42 Furthermore, with the UK’s continuing
membership of the EU increasingly uncertain as a national
referendum looms, and the US presidential election due
to take place in November 2016, it is relatively uncertain
what direction the negotiations will take in the months
ahead. However, with the election of Jeremy Corbyn as
leader of the Labour Party in 2015, it is quite possible
that pressure upon the UK Government to lobby for a
more transparent process may increase.43 Having briefly
assessed the quite legitimate concerns overshadowing the
TTIP negotiations, it is clear that the negotiating parties
must earnestly respond. If the parties genuinely desire to
reach a satisfactory conclusion and acquire public
confidence, one may be tempted to encourage the
Commission and American counterparts to heed the
wisdom of Jeremy Bentham, who warned against the
dangers of secret justice:
“In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil
in every shape have full swing. Only in proportion
as publicity has place can any of the checks
applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there
is no publicity there is no justice.”44
The rights balance
Since the mid-1960s, theICSID has offered foreign
investors an impartial, international dispute settlement
forum allowing them to sue host states for breach of
investment protection standards often contained in
investment agreements such as bilateral investment
treaties (BITs).45 ISDS brought to an end the traditional
court system as a means of resolving international
investment disputes by promoting international arbitration
and therefore depoliticising investment disputes.46 In
November 2015, the Commission unveiled a chapter on
investment with a proposal for an investment court system
to be included in the TTIP with a mandate to handle
EU–US investor–state disputes.47 They include plans for
a public investment court system with an appeal tribunal
composed of publicly appointed judges, modelled on the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) appellant body and
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
However, it is debatable whether the inclusion of an
international court system in TTIP is the answer to the
challenges facing the ISDS system. This part of the article
advances the argument that despite its encroachment on
the democratic values and human rights highlighted
above, through the international investment court system,
TTIP has the potential to infuse greater balance into the
private property and national interest debate. The rejection
of ISDS for encroaching on regulatory autonomy provides
a benchmark for judging the reforms made under the
international investment court proposal.48 Ideally, the
system should provide states with the right to regulate in
the national interest without fear of suits from disgruntled
investors claiming breach of investment protection
standards contained in TTIP. However, from the outset,
it is evident that the proposal has failed to address the
rights balance given that it retains the essential
characteristics of ISDS.
First and foremost, under the proposed international
investment court system, foreign investors would still be
in a privileged position to circumvent domestic courts
and bring claims directly to an international court. It
remains that only foreign investors, not states or domestic
investors, can launch international proceedings for breach
of investment commitments. In the past, this has been
met with disastrous consequences for the host state. For
example, South Africa was sued for instituting a
mandatory 26% ownership stake in the mining industry
for black South Africans in a bid to overcome
apartheid-centric inequalities.49 Although the foreign
investors ultimately dropped their claim, South Africa
was left with over £3 million in legal fees to pay and the
pressure of the case forced the Government to allow the
Italian investors’ companies to transfer only 5% of
ownership to black South Africans. Thus, under the
international court system, foreign investors retain
42A Eurobarometer survey in spring 2015 revealed that between spring 2013 and spring 2014, 56% of respondents across all Member States tended not to trust the EU
whereas just 31% of respondents tended to trust the EU. In spring 2015, those who tended to trust the EU had increased to 40% whereas 46% tended not to trust the EU.
Additionally, in spring 2015, just 32% of respondents in the UK felt that the EU conjured a “positive” image. See Commission, “Public Opinion in the European Union”,
Standard Eurobarometer 83 (spring 2015), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_publ_en.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2016].
43 Jeremy Corbyn has been sceptical of the TTIP proposals, demanding that public services be safeguarded. Furthermore, the leader of the Labour Party has been joined by
the leaders of the SNP, UKIP, the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party and all major Northern Ireland parties in demanding that the National Health Service be exempt from
TTIP. See, for example, Channel 4 News, “Jeremy Corbyn on TTIP, Trident and the NHS” (16 December 2015), available at: http://www.channel4.com/news/jeremy-corbyn
-on-ttip-trident-and-the-nhs [Accessed 27 June 2016]. See also A. McSmith, “TTIP: Jeremy Corbyn, Nigel Farage, Nicola Sturgeon and Natalie Bennett sign appeal to
exempt NHS from trade deal”, Independent, 26 October 2015.
44 Scott v Scott [1913] A.C. 417 HL at 477 per Lord Shaw.
45C. Brown, “The Development and Importance of theModel Bilateral Investment Treaty” in C. Brown (ed.),Commentaries on SelectedModel Investment Treaties (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p.4; T. Gazzini, “Bilateral Investment Treaties” in T. Gazzini and E. de Brabandere (eds), International Investment Law: The Sources of
Rights and Obligations (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp.106–107.
46N. van den Broek, “Protection of Investors in International Trade and Investment Regime: A Practical Comparison” in J. Huerta-Goldman, A. Romanetti and F. Stirnimann
(eds),WTO Arbitration, Investment Arbitration, and Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2013), p.15, p.23; Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and
Public Law (2007), Ch.7; Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints (2013), Chs 1 and 4.
47TTIP (12 November 2015), Ch.II: Investment.
48The positions of trade unions can be found on their websites, e.g. IGMetall, available at: http://www.tradeunionfreedom.co.uk/ig-metall-demands-halt-to-ttip-negotiations
/ [Accessed 27 June 2016]. See also ETUC, available at: https://www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-position-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership#.VqdyjE9Jcsk
[Accessed 27 June 2016]. The German media was critical of ISDS in TTIP; see, for example, H. Buchter, P. Pinzler and W. Ucharius, “Was handeln wir uns da ein”, Die
Zeit, 26 June 2014.
49Foresti and De Carli v Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/07/01.
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arguably greater private property rights than those
provided for under national constitutional law, which is
in many ways discriminatory.50
Secondly, by widening the scope of dispute settlement
to EU–US investors, the international court system is
unlikely to deter investors from launching vexatious suits;
rather it indirectly promotes such action. Thus, the
economic rationale for launching suits remains the same,
with investors having already claimed nearly €30 billion
in compensation from EU Member States through BITs
and other international investment agreements.51 Thus,
claims are likely to increase and ultimately it is EU–US
taxpayers’ money that would end up in the pockets of
multinationals. While the essential characteristics of the
investment court system appear eerily familiar, the
continued encroachment on the social–economic policies
of Member States compounds the concern.
Thirdly, as aforementioned, the proposal for ISDSwas
overwhelmingly rejected by the EU civil society, largely
owing to its impact on national policy-making. It is
evident that these concerns have not been addressed
despite the introduction of a public court with elected
judges to handle investment disputes. Clearly, making
the forum public without changing the rules of
engagement is likely to lead to the same results. As a
result, there is a growing perception among the business
community, academics andMember States that investors
are unduly interfering in wholly democratic choices of
sovereign nations.52 This has culminated in a number of
countries withdrawing from international investment
agreements that provide for investment arbitration. For
example, Russia opted to withdraw from the Energy
Charter Treaty in 2009 following its dissatisfaction with
the Yukos Universal award,53 and Italy withdrew six years
later largely owing to fear of suits over developments in
its renewable energy sector.54 In South America, Bolivia
terminated international agreements with provision for
investor–state arbitration following a suit by an American
company for cancellation of their concession agreement
owing to water price hikes.55 This shows that national
governments are growing tired of foreign investors suing
them for policy changes that are in the national interest.56
This is unlikely to subsist under the international
investment court system simply because investors retain
the same protection. Although art.2 of the Investment
Chapter provides that sovereign states have a right to
regulate in the public interest,57 there is no guidance on
what constitutes necessary measures or legitimate
objectives, and thus it is most likely that judges at the
investment court would be called upon to make that
determination. Essentially, art.2 maintains the same
position as its predecessor by allowing the so-called
“judges” to make determinations on whether a foreign
investor should be compensated for breach of substitutive
protection standards.
Last but not least, this concern is exacerbated by the
inclusion of broad investor protection standards such as
FET and investors’ legitimate expectations.58 Although
TTIP introduces some qualification on the FET standard,59
this is unlikely to prevent expansive interpretation because
the list of qualifying breaches is not exhaustive. Investors
have in the past relied on these broad standards to claim
against anti-smoking legislation in Australia60 and a
lawsuit against Canada over a fracking ban in Quebec,61
and thus it appears that the reform of investment
protection standards is merely cosmetic. Similarly, art.3(4)
of the Investment Chapter retains the legitimate
expectations ground which has in the past been used as
a weapon against government regulation that conflicts
with foreign investor’s commercial interests. For example,
in Bilcon, an investor was able to successfully challenge
national policy on the ground of legitimate expectations
made through representations by the government before
investing, contrary to Canada’s core community values
not to allow a mining and marine project owing to fears
over environmental damage.62 Furthermore, even though
50 See C. Tietje and F. Baetens, “The Impact of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership”, Study prepared for the
Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (24 June 2014).
51 Friends of the Earth Europe, “The hidden cost of EU trade deals” (December 2014).
52C.H. Brower, “Obstacles and Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes” in K.P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment
Law and Policy 2008–2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.356.
53 Yukos Universal Ltd (Isle of Man) v Russian Federation , UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.AA 227.
54Russian withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty, available at: http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=414; L.E. Peterson, “Italy Follows Russia in Withdrawing from
Energy Charter Treaty, but for Surprising Reason” (17 April 2015), International Arbitration Reporter, available at: http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20150417_1 [Both
accessed 27 June 2016].
55Guaracachi America Inc and Rurelec Plc v The Plurinational State of Bolivia (PCA Case No.2011-17).
56 In Europe, the right to property is laid down in Protocol I to the European Convention on Human Rights and in art.17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. See L. Johnson and O. Volkov, “State Liability for Regulatory Change: How International Investment Rules are Overriding Domestic Law” (2014) 5 Investment
Treaty News 3; A. Newcombe and L. Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. Standards of Treatment (Kluwers Law International, 2009), p.322.
57TTIP (12 November 2015), Ch.II: Investment art.2.1: “The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of the Parties to regulate within their territories through
measures necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or
promotion and protection of cultural diversity.” See Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th edn, edited by James Crawford (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), p.448.
58 J. Stone, “Arbitrariness, the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, and the International Law of Investment” (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 82; R.
Dolzer, “Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours” (2013) 12(7) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 16.
59 “2 A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in paragraph 1 where a measure or a series of measures constitutes:
(a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; or
(b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of transparency and obstacles to effective access to justice, in judicial and administrative
proceedings; or
(c) manifest arbitrariness; or
(d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or religious belief; or
(e) harassment, coercion, abuse of power or similar bad faith conduct; or
(f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.”
60Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.ARB/10/7.
61 Lone Pine Resources Inc v Government of Canada, ICSID Case No.UNCT/15/2.
62Bilcon of Delaware v Government of Canada, Award on jurisdiction and liability (17 March 2015), PCA Case No.2009-04.
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investment courts cannot force the government to change
its laws, they can order costly awards that would
ultimately flow out of the public purse. Armed with an
arsenal of substantive investment protection provisions
in TTIP, foreign investors are likely to continue to enjoy
the same unfettered rights as those found under ISDS.
In light of the aforementioned, as a way forward, the
architects of TTIP should make negotiations more
transparent by keeping the European Parliament informed
about the developments and encouraging the involvement
of civil society groups in the process. In this regard, rather
than publishing brief factsheets, the Commission should
publish the full negotiation documents. Furthermore,
proposals for the creation of a court subsidiarity system
to ensure that state parties to a dispute are able to rely on
interim measures to settle disputes through mediation
before resorting to the investment court should be
considered.
Conclusion
Democratic and human rights concerns will inevitably
arise as Western economies continue to stride in a
liberalising direction by breaking down trade barriers and
cutting “red tape” in the pursuit of prosperity. The extent
to which states deal with these legitimate concerns
remains an enduring challenge whenever business
interests run the risk of overshadowing the interests of
civil society. As this article has illustrated, the ongoing
TTIP negotiations are proving no exception. The means
of dispute settlement remains arguably the single most
controversial issue of the negotiations. If the final
proposals resemble the much-criticised ISDS system and
hand a significant advantage to corporations in legal
disputes, it is doubtful that the most fervent of sceptics
will regard the TTIP deal as anything but the further
erosion of sovereignty to the advantage of corporate
power at the expense of civil society. Although small
victories have been won by those lobbying for greater
transparency, there remain many steps the negotiating
parties could take to allay the apprehensions that millions
of European and American citizens have towards the
unprecedented trade deal.
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